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JUDGING IN THE GOOD SOCIETY:




In his great book, Justice Accused, l Robert Cover wrote of anti-
slavery judges whose adherence to a formal conception of the judicial
role prevented them from using their judicial authority to oppose slav-
ery. Although morally opposed to the institution of slavery as anti-
thetical to their vision of a good society, they nevertheless enforced
fugitive slave laws and in other ways upheld the legal apparatus of
slavery.
Cover, who perhaps more than most appreciated "the complexity
of moral choice,"2 understood those judges to have confronted a
"moral-formal dilemma."3 I quote from Cover's description of that
dilemma:
[T]he judge's problem in any case where some impact on the for-
mal apparatus could be expected, was never a single-dimensioned
moral question is slavery or enslavement, or rendition to slavery,
morally justified or reprehensible? rather, the issue was whether
the moral values served by antislavery (the substantive moral di-
mension) outweighed interests and values served by fidelity to the
formal system principles or to the content of the principles them-
selves. In a sense the moral-formal decision was a moral-moral
decision a decision between the substantive moral propositions re-
lating to slavery and liberty and the moral ends served by the for-
mal structure as a whole, by fidelity to it, or by some relevant
particular element of it. Thus, the legal actor did not choose be-
tween liberty and slavery. He had to choose between liberty and
ordered federalism; between liberty and consistent limits on the ju-
dicial function; between liberty and fidelity to public trust; between
liberty and adherence to the public corporate undertakings of na-
tionhood; or, as some of the judges would have it, between liberty
and the viability of the social compact.4
* William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
R . COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
2 Id. at xi.
3 Id. at 195.
4 Id. at 197-98.
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I was reminded of Cover's important insight about the moral
choices confronting judges as I studied the opinions and writings of
Justice Scalia in preparation for this symposium. For Justice Scalia,
as for the antislavery judges, the "good society" encompasses not only
"substantive moral dimensions," but a "formal structure," and judges
fit into that formal structure in a way that both inhibits and directs
their exercise of judicial power.
Justice Scalia's deep commitment to the "formal structure," as
he understands it, is more than "an intellectual preference for a dis-
passionate, rationalistic method of deciding cases."5 It is central to
his view of the good society. As George Kannar has suggested,6 Jus-
tice Scalia's methodological commitments, at times, may even trump
his own strongly held views on substantive issues.
However, unlike the antislavery judges, more often than not Jus-
tice Scalia's positivist view of the formal constraints on the exercise of
judicial authority leads to results that seem to be consistent with his
substantive philosophical, political, and economic beliefs. Thus, in
most cases he need not confront a moral-formal (or moral-moral) di-
lemma. His correct behavior as a judge leads to the correct result in
the case.
I. THE LAW OF RULES
Justice Scalia's conception of the formal constraints on the exer-
cise of judicial authority is both principled and inflexible. It leaves
little room for balancing competing interests, for assessing compelling
state interests, for requiring less intrusive alternatives, for looking to
the totality of the circumstances, for exercising judicial discretion. It
is rule oriented in its view of the basis for judges' power to act, as well
as of the way cases ought to be decided.
For Justice Scalia, the rule of law should be a "law of rules." 7
Judges must find their authority for acting in existing legal rules con-
tained in the text of a constitution, statute, or judicial precedent, in
textual language whose "plain meaning" or original purpose furnishes
a basis for precise, principled rule making. Justice Scalia's originalist
approach to the interpretation of texts restricts judicial consideration
of "evolving concepts" of justice to "the actual practices of the soci-
ety, as reflected in the laws enacted by its legislatures."'
5 Wizner, Passion in Legal Argument and Judicial Decision Making: A Comment on
Goldberg v. Kelly, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 179, 192 (1988).
6 Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
7 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
8 Id. at 1184. See also Scalia, Originalism: the Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
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Similarly, in their decisions judges should aspire to general rules,
not fact-specific rulings that leave discretion to judges in future cases
to decide similar issues on fact-specific grounds.
Justice Scalia takes a dim view of judicial discretion employed to
advance the welfare of society, achieve social justice, or protect indi-
vidual interests. The "common-law, discretion-conferring approach" 9
to deciding individual cases should, in his view, give way to the neces-
sity for rule-based rule making, even if on the facts of a particular case
the result may not be what appears right as a matter of justice or
policy.
Justice Scalia does not advocate this rule-bound approach to ju-
dicial decision making for purely formalistic reasons. For him there is
much more at stake no less than his vision of the good society. Here
is how he describes it:
[Tihe value of perfection in judicial decisions should not be over-
rated. To achieve what is, from the standpoint of the substantive
policies involved, the "perfect" answer is nice but it is just one of a
number of competing values. And one of the most substantial of
those competing values, which often contradicts the search for
perfection, is the appearance of equal treatment. As a motivating
force of the human spirit, that value cannot be overestimated....
The Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice more than any
other provision of the Constitution. And the trouble with the dis-
cretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does
not satisfy this sense of justice very well .... Much better, even at
the expense of the mild substantive distortion that any generaliza-
tion introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one
can point to in explanation of the decision. 1
It is this idea of the social importance of generally applicable
rules that may explain Justice Scalia's sweeping majority opinion ear-
lier this year in Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith." In that case, the Court reversed an Oregon
Supreme Court decision holding unconstitutional on first amendment
free exercise grounds the denial of unemployment benefits to members
of the Native American Church whose sacramental use of peyote re-
sulted in their dismissal from employment.
The claimants argued that the state lacked a compelling interest
"[E]ven if one assumes ... that the Constitution was originally meant to expound evolving
rather than permanent values ... I see no basis for believing that supervision of the evolution
would have been committed to the courts." Id. at 862.
9 Id. at 1178.
10 Id.
I1 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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that could not be served by less intrusive means in denying them un-
employment benefits, and that therefore the denial of benefits imposed
an unnecessary, and unconstitutional, burden on their free exercise of
religion. Four Justices (O'Connor, Blackmun, Brennan, and Mar-
shall) agreed with the claimants' assertion that a balancing test should
be applied. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, came out on
the state's side; the other three dissented.
But Justice Scalia, in a radical departure from what had become
the customary approach to such cases balancing the state's interest in
uniform enforcement of its law against the individual's assertion of
religious exemption from particular effects of the law's enforcement,
the exempton to be allowed and the religous practice accommodated
unless the court determines that the state has a compelling interest in
the particular application of the law that cannot be served by less
intrusive means enunciated a "single categorical rule:"' 2 "[I]f prohib-
iting the exercise of religion ... is ... merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amend-
ment has not been offended."'I3 In Justice O'Connor's words, this new
rule "disregard[s] our consistent application of free exercise doctrine
to cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden reli-
gious conduct."'
4
With a sweep of the pen, Justice Scalia rewrote Supreme Court
constitutional history in the first amendment area to conform to his
view of the proper role of the judiciary in a good society. So central to
Justice Scalia's vision of the good society is a judiciary bound by and
articulating general rules that are not subject to the exercise of judicial
discretion, that he appears to be prepared to abandon the traditional
special role of judges in protecting individuals and minorities from the
democratic process:
[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is consti-
tutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its crea-
tion can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a rela-
tive disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely en-
gaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social im-
portance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. '5
12 Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
14 Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
15 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
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One can only wonder what the result in Smith would have been
had the proscribed practice involved ritual circumcision of male chil-
dren, or special methods of slaughtering animals for food, or even the
use of wine as a sacrament. It is likely that a balancing approach
would protect all of those practices. It is equally likely that Justice
Scalia'a categorical rule would not.
Lest there be any doubt about that conclusion, here is Justice
Scalia's rationale for his interpretation of the first amendment text:
[T]he "exercise of religion" often involves not only belief and pro-
fession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts:
assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sac-
ramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from cer-
tain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true, we
think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a state
would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to
ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they
display. 16
However, the constitutional protection of the "free exercise of
religion" does not prohibit a state from "requiring any individual to
observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the per-
formance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires). As a
textual matter, we do not think the words must be given that
meaning."17
It is slight consolation to hope that the democratic legislative
process would protect or exempt these particular religious practices
because they are "widely engaged in."' 8
16 Id. at 1599.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1606. It might be argued that since Justice O'Connor reaches the same substan-
tive result as Justice Scalia, while claiming to employ a method that accommodates religious
practices, we are better off with the Scalia approach which denies judicial authority to create
religious exemptions. In Mark Tushnet's words, "It is best ... for the system to be set up so
that somewhere someone will see the blood on his or her hands." (Personal communication to
the author. October 30, 1990). The difficulty I have with this view is its assumption that if the
judiciary is denied (or disclaims) the power to protect minority religious practices, either the
democratic legislative process will, or the religious intolerance of the political system will be
exposed. This approach derives from a view that it is preferable for the legislature to protect
minorities, or that minorities not be protected, rather than for courts to be expected to perform
that role. I might be tempted to agree with Professor Tushnet were it not for the fact that
courts often do relieve minority religious practices from legislatively and administratively im-
posed burdens. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 298 (1963); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Standing
Justice Scalia's theory of standing is in contrast to his notion that
judges ought to decide cases, to the maximum extent possible, by ar-
ticulating categorical rules of general applicability. In his view, the
requirement that a plaintiff have suffered a particularlized, legal in-
jury "which sets him apart from the citizenry at large" is "a crucial
and inseparable element" of the principle of separation of powers.
Disregard of that principle "will inevitably produce . . . an
overjudicialization of the process of self-governance.'" 9
What is the relationship between the doctrine of standing and the
separation of powers? For Justice Scalia, the relationship is a "func-
tional" one: in order to confer standing, a plaintiff's injury must be a
"legal" injury, which "by definition" is one that results from violation
of a "legal right;" a legal right, in turn, can only be "created by the
legislature."20 Hence, for a court to recognize and protect a right not
specifically created by the legislature is to violate the principle of sepa-
ration of powers.
As with his theory of rules, Justice Scalia's version of the stand-
ing doctrine is central to his vision of the' role of the judiciary in a
good society:
[T]he law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional
undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against
impositions of the majority, and excludes them from the even more
undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
should function in order to serve the interest of-the majority itself.21
Obviously, this narrow view of standing is the antithesis of the
liberalized view that would confer standing in any situation in which
a party is in fact adversely affected or aggrieved by government ac-
tion, particularly if they are "individuals and minorities" seeking judi-
cial protection from the "impositions of the majority.
'22
B. Deference to Agency Interpretation of Statutes
Justice Scalia's belief that courts should give nearly conclusive
deference to statutory interpretations by administrative agencies,23
notwithstanding his own philosophical reservations about the capac-
19 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881-82 (1983).
20 Id. at 885.
21 Id. at 894 (emphasis in original).
22 Id.
23 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
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ity of government to manage economic and other matters, 24 is a fur-
ther reflection of his conception of the proper role of the judiciary in a
good society. In Justice Scalia's view, excessive deference to agency
interpretation of law, like the narrow approach to standing, is re-
quired by the doctrine of separation of powers.
Judicial deference is due even when an agency interprets a statute
"'one way today and another way tomorrow."25 The reason is not
that "the agency knows more about it than [judges] do, that somehow
they have more expertise, because they were present at the founding
when the statute was passed, or because they have worked with the
statute more and therefore they are smarter about it than [judges]
are. '26 In fact, they may not be better than judges at interpreting the
statutes they are charged with enforcing. Rather,
the reason that [courts] give deference to the agency's interpreta-
tion.., has something to do with the allocation of power among
the branches of government. Where Congress chooses not to be
specific in a statute, as it often does, where it leaves something
open, where it leaves interstices in the strict meaning of the law,
the general principle is that the filling-in of those interstices has
been left to the agency ... .27
In his use of the term "interstices" to refer to gaps or ambiguities
in statutory language that invite interpretation ("interstitial lawmak-
ing"), Justice Scalia cannot have been unmindful of Cardozo's use of
that very term in his justly famous lectures on judicial discretion.28
But, as we have seen, Justice Scalia's objective is to restrict the exer-
cise of judicial discretion, not, like Cardozo, to rationalize it. Even
though, as an administrative law specialist, Justice Scalia is at least as
aware as the ordinary citizen of the frequently inefficient, arbitrary,
inconsistent, and erroneous actions of bureaucrats who exercise dis-
cretion within administrative agencies, he is prepared in the name of
separation of powers to grant them the exclusive right to fill in "inter-
stices" in their governing statutes, in order to avoid the "overudicial-
ization of the process of self-governance."
29
It is such excessive deference to administrative interpretatons of
law that can lead to decisions like the Court's five-to-four holding in
24 See, e.g., Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism and the Legal Order, 9 J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 123,
127 (1986).
25 Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 191, 193 (1986).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 69, 114 (1921).
29 Scalia, supra note 19, at 881.
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Sullivan v. Everhart. 30 Sullivan involved the interpretation of over-
payment provisions of the Social Security Act that prohibited "adjust-
ment of payments to, or recovery.., from, any person who is without
fault if such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of [the
statute] or would be against equity and good conscience."31 A similar
provision of the Act regarding overpayments of Supplemental Secur-
ity Income benefits directed the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices to "avoidf penalizing such individual or his eligible spouse who
was without fault in connection with the overpayment, if adjustment
or recovery on account of such overpayment . . . would defeat the
purposes of [the statute], or be against equity and good conscience
",32
In a 1979 decision, Califano v. Yamasaki,33 the Court had held
that Social Security beneficiaries who had received overpayments had
a due process right pursuant to these statutory provisions to a hearing
where they would have an opportunity to demonstrate that they were
entitled to waiver of recovery of the overpayments on hardship
grounds. Notwithstanding this precedent, and the clear intent of the
statute, Justice Scalia's opinion for the five-to-four majority in Sulli-
van v. Everhart 34 upheld an administrative interpretation of the stat-
ute that permits the agency to "net" overpayments and
underpayments from the month of the first payment error to the
month in which the agency determines that a payment error was
made.
Thus, if over a period of months the Social Security Administra-
tion first overpays, then underpays a beneficiary, as happened to the
plaintiffs in this case, the regulation permits the agency to recover the
overpayment by "netting" it together with subsequent underpayment,
thereby preventing the beneficiary from obtaining the additional
amount owed as a result of the underpayments, and from seeking the
waiver provided for in the statute for hardships situations where the
beneficiary is not at fault.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia strained to uphold this
agency interpretation, asserting that the statutory language "reason-
ably bears the Secretary's interpretation that netting is permitted,"'3
since the statute "nowhere specifies that the correctness of payments
30 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990).
31 Id. at 963 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 404(b)).
32 Id. at 963 n.** (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(1)(B)).
33 442 U.S. 682.
34 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990).
35 Id. at 966.
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must be determined on a month-by-month basis," 36 and therefore the
Secretary was free to interpret the statutory term "payment" to en-
compass several monthly payments.
In his determination to give deference to the agency interpreta-
tion of the statute, Justice Scalia went out of his way to find a possible
reading of the statutory language that would uphold the Secretary's
netting regulation, even if that meant ignoring the waiver provision
enacted by Congress, and the Court's own precedent in the Yamasaki
case.
As Justice Stevens wrote in dissent, this result is "inconsistent
with both common sense and the plain terms of the statute. '37 "The
kingly power to rewrite history has not been delegated to the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services. Nevertheless, the Secretary now
claims authority to determine that no underpayment has been made
to a beneficiary who concededly received a deficient monthly pay-
ment ' ' a in any situation where an overpayment has been made in a
prior month, even if that overpayment was due solely to agency error,
and even if the subsequent underpayment causes hardship to the
beneficiary.
As Justice Stevens observed, Congress intentionally differentiated
between underpayments and overpayments, mandating payment
without qualification in the case of underpayments, while subjecting
recovery of overpayments to mandatory waiver procedures.
The reason for this distinction is easily surmised. A needy person
who unknowingly receives an overpayment may spend it, not real-
izing that the Government will later take back money by reducing
needed benefits, or by refusing to compensate for a prior underpay-
ment. The beneficiary may be left without money essential to pay
monthly bills.39
The Secretary's netting procedure, in Justice Stevens's words "is
nothing short of rewriting history to destroy a citizen's valuable statu-
tory right."'' The "netting regulations permit the Secretary to ac-
complish what the waiver provisions plainly and unequivocally
forbid; namely a recovery by the United States of overpayments with-
out a hearing on waiver."'"
In Justice Scalia's "good society," the idea of separation of pow-
ers requires judges to interpret statutes in such a manner as to uphold
36 Id. at 965.
37 Id. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38 Id.
39 Id..
40 Id. at 970.
41 Id. at 971 (citation omitted).
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administrative agency regulations purporting to carry out congre-
sional intent, even when that is manifestly not the case. While this
may well be a principled approach to the separation-of-powers doc-
trine, it is also a highly theoretical and rigid one that sacrifices the
welfare of individuals on the altar of principle.42
An alternative, more realistic approach to the separation of pow-
ers recognizes the dynamic relationship between the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches of government in protecting and promoting
democratic values. In his study of Judicial Discretion 43 the Israeli
jurist, Aharon Barak, has written:
The pure, theoretical model of separation of powers, in which
each governmental authority is separate, is not only not accepted,
but also is not desirable. In a democratic regime, one must strike a
balance between majority rule and fundamental democratic values.
This balance cannot exist if each branch stands alone, without in-
teracting with the other branches, and without balancing and su-
pervision. This situation will ultimately lead to an accumulation of
strength and power in the hands of one of the branches, with the
result that the democracy's fundamental values will be harmed.
This will frustrate the very goal of the separation of powers, which
is not to create an independent, theoretical structure, but to guar-
antee the fundamental values of the democracy.44
It is through the exercise of judicial discretion in the interpreta-
tion of constitutional and statutory texts that the judicial branch car-
ries out its unique role of judicial review. This means that in a case
like Sullivan v. Everhart,45 the "judiciary is the final authority on is-
sues of statutory construction and must reject administrative con-
structions which are contrary to clear congressional intent."
46
III. JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Benjamin Cardozo once observed that "the judge is under a duty,
42 Toby Golick has identified four elements of Justice Scalia's approach to claims made on
behalf of poor people challenging administrative agency interpretations of statutes: (1) ignore
the legislative and administrative history, and the purpose, of the program in question; (2)
ignore the consequences to the claimant of the court's decision; (3) examine the statutory
language to determine whether its "plain meaning" compels the result sought by the claimants
"reasonably bears" the interpretation of the agency; (4) if the plain meaning of the statutory
language does not compel the result sought by the claimant, defer to the agency interpretation.
Golick, Justice Scalia, Poverty and the Good Society, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1817, 1823-24
(1991).
43 A. BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1989).
44 Id. at 204.
45 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990).
46 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
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within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain a relation
between law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and
those of reason and good conscience."47 Cardozo was critical of "ana-
lytical jurists" whose emphasis on the "verbal niceties of definition"
caused them to lose sight of the "deeper and finer realities of ends and
aims and functions," to insist "that morality and justice are not
law .... 48
Justice Scalia has conceded that "one would be foolish to deny
the relevance of moral perceptions to law," and he understands "the
word 'justice' to have a moral connotation. ' 49 But he rejects Car-
dozo's conclusion that judges ought to exercise judicial discretion
which, however "informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disci-
plined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of or-
der in the social life,' ",0 nevertheless strives to achieve justice and
promote the fundamental moral norms of the society.
In Cardozo's words, "when the demon of formalism tempts the
intellect with the lure of scientific order," a judge needs to be re-
minded that "the final cause of law is the welfare of society."'"
Justice Scalia understands the judge's obligation to "do justice"
in the legal positivist sense: ". . . deciding the rights of litigants ... in
accordance with the laws as they are written .... " 52 Thus, he writes,
"... I have never been able to isolate obligations of justice, except by
defining them as those obligations that the law imposes." 53
Justice Scalia's "originalist," "plain meaning," approach to the
interpretation of legal texts, combined with his highly formalistic the-
ory of separation of powers, leaves litle room for the exercise of judi-
cial discretion in carrying out "those obligations that the law
imposes."'5 4 But, as Barak has observed, "[l]aw without discretion ul-
timately yields arbitrariness.""
Justice Scalia's opinions in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith 6 and Sullivan v. Everhart57 exemplify
how a rigid, formalistic approach to the exercise of judicial function
can lead to unjust results-in the case of Smith, a categorical rule that
47 B. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 133-34.
48 Id. at 134.
49 Scalia, supra note 24, at 123.
50 B. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 141 (citation omitted).
51 Id. at 66.
52 SCALIA, supra note 24, at 123.
53 Id. at 125.
54 Id.
55 A. BARAK, supra note 42, at 261.
56 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
57 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990).
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threatens the free exercise of religion by minority religious groups;
and in Everhart, the upholding of an agency regulation that contra-
vened the clear intent of an act of Congress and de facto overruled a
controlling judicial precedent, both of which were intended to protect
the welfare of the poor.
In Justice Scalia's vision of the good society, judges have a very
limited role, one that is rule-bound, essentially nondiscretionary, and
rigidly deferential to the other branches of government. He believes
that the rule of law demands no less than reverence for "the formal
structure." 8
While the rule of law may be a necessary attribute of any "good
society" we are likely to know, it does not guarantee that a society
will be good. We need only recall Nazi Germany, or consider South
African apartheid, to be reminded that a society may be governed by
legal rules and nevertheless be unjust and immoral. In the words of
Grant Gilmore:
Law reflects, but in no sense determines the moral worth of a
society. The values of a reasonably just society will reflect them-
selves in a reasonably just law. The better the society, the less law
there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie
down with the lamb. The values of an unjust society will reflect
themselves in an unjust law. The worse the society, the more law
there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due pro-
cess will be meticulously observed.59
To be good, a society requires not just law, but just law. In the
good society not only the legislature and the executive, but the judici-
ary, and especially the judiciary, must pursue justice.
In his classic study of Democracy in America,6° Alexis de Toc-
queville wrote that "there is hardly a political question in the United
States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one .... 61
Tocqueville's well-known statement is not simply a perceptive obser-
vation about a unique attribute of the American political system. It
cuts to the core of our national identity, and points to an essential
element of the American definition of the good society.
Judicial review of legislative and executive actions not only pro-
vides a political check and balance against unconstitutional excesses
or failures of elected or appointed government officials, but also serves
to advance the American ideal of protecting individuals and minori-
58 R. COVER, supra note 1, at 197.
59 G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977).
60 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
61 Id. (J. P. Mayer, ed.) at 270.
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ties from majoritarian governmental decision making by the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government.
Self-imposed rigid, formalistic limitations on the exercise of judi-
cial review inhibit judges from carrying out this special responsibility.
For, to the extent that a judge subscribes to a legalistic and inflexible
understanding of formal interpretive doctrines such as judicial re-
straint, limited judicial discretion, adherence to precedent, strict con-
struction of textual language, and deference to legislative and
executive interpretations of constitutional and statutory provisions, he
will not broadly exercise his judicial authority to protect the weak and
powerless from the will or indifference of the majority.
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